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ABSTRACT 
The growth of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) imposes increasing costs on organizations 
and causes considerable aggravation on the part of e-mail recipients. A thriving anti-spam 
industry addresses some of the frustration. Regulation and various economic and technical 
means are in the works. All anti-spam measures aim at bringing down the flood of unwanted 
commercial e-mail.  
This paper contributes to the understanding of the UCE phenomenon by drawing on scholarly 
work in areas of marketing and resource ownership and use.  Adapting the tragedy of the 
commons concept to e-mail, we identify a causal structure that drives the direct e-marketing 
industry. Computer simulations indicate that although filtering may be an effective method to curb 
UCE arriving at individual inboxes, it is likely to increase the aggregate volume, thereby boosting 
overall costs.  We also examine other response mechanisms, including self-regulation, 
government regulation, and market mechanisms. We find that, of the various countermeasures, 
filtering appears to be the best currently available but that none are a satisfactory solution. The 
analysis advances understanding of the digital commons, the economics of UCE, and provides 
practical implications for the direct e-marketing industry. 
Keywords:  unwanted commercial email (UCE), SPAM, email marketing, markets for attention, 
information overload, tragedy of the commons, system dynamics, simulation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Computer-mediated communication is one of the accepted channels in the mix of outlets that 
modern companies rely on to advertise and sell their products (Figure 1). Electronic mail (e-mail) 
advertising generated nearly a billion dollars in revenue in 2001 and is predicted to reach several 
billion dollars within a few years [Martin et al., 2003]. Reputable commercial establishments, such 
as J.C. Penney, Barnes and Noble, and Borders use e-mail for communicating with customers 
[Martin et al., 2003]. The marketing industry’s search for an optimal portfolio of online and 
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traditional advertising [Kover, 1999; Sheehan and Doherty, 2001] is expected eventually to evolve 
into integrated marketing communication programs [Brackett and Carr, 2001]. 
A cleverly designed direct marketing campaign contributes to overall sales [Chiang et al., 2003].  
E-mail is more attractive than regular mail due to its lower distribution cost, wider reach, 
convenience, and faster responses [Mehta and Sivadas, 1995; Sheehan and McMillan, 1999; 
Martin et al., 2003].   The cost of sending e-mail is $5 to $7 per one thousand messages, while it 
is $500 to $700 for the same volume of regular mail – two orders of magnitude greater [Martin et 
al., 2003].  Moreover, digital marketing campaigns are easier to customize, which can produce 
better response rates than mail campaigns [Ansari and Mela, 2003]. Timing is also an issue. It 
takes, for example, 5 to 10 days to receive a response to e-mail surveys, versus 10 to 15 days to 
postal surveys [Sheehan and McMillan, 1999]. By including hyperlinks, e-mail allows a degree of 
interactivity not afforded by conventional direct mail campaigns [Martin et al., 2003].    
 
Adapted from [DMIS, 2004] 
Figure 1: Shares of Total Marketing Expenditure in 2003 by Channel:  
The UK Case. 
 
DRAWBACKS OF DIRECT E-MARKETING 
Despite the many benefits to senders of direct e-marketing campaigns, the impacts are 
pernicious on consumers, e-mail providers, and organizations. Many users are angry and 
frustrated because they must sift through mountains of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) in 
their inboxes. E-mail administrators struggle to maintain high service quality in the face of 
increasing server loads, storage requirements, and security threats. Of the roughly 31 billion daily 
e-mails sent globally, about 12.4 billion (41 percent) are considered UCE [Spam Filter Review, 
2005]  – MSN alone blocks 2.4 billion per day [Unspam, 2005].  The average e-mail user receives 
4.5 adult content e-mails per day, 16 percent of users change their e-mail address because of 
UCE saturation, and 4.5 seconds of corporate time is wasted per spam message [Halverson.Org, 
2005]. With some users receiving hundreds of UCE messages per day [Halverson.Org, 2005], it 
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Development) examined the costs of UCE, finding that in June 2004, the annual spam cost per 
employee exceeded $1900 and the annual lost productivity per employee equaled 3.1 percent 
[Anonymous, 2004].  Corporations are burdened by the financial and intangible costs of spam, 
and managers struggle to find solutions to UCE [Corbitt, 2004]. They fear that the situation is 
likely to become more grave in the future [Fallows, 2003].  
II. THE QUEST FOR EYEBALLS: ATTENTION AS A SCARCE RESOURCE 
Over thirty years ago, Nobel laureate Herbert Simon [1971] observed that attention is a scarce 
resource in an information-rich society.  In the parlance of modern theory, the attention of workers 
can be viewed as a strategic asset that determines the long-term success of an organization 
[Davenport and Beck, 2001]. When more information arrives than individuals can process, an 
information overload [Simon, 1971] occurs, and the likelihood of organizational failure increases.   
“The design principle that attention is scarce and must be preserved is very 
different from a principle of “the more information the better.” Simon[1971, p. 44]) 
Examples of information overload are abundant. Perlow [1999], for example, describes a software 
company characterized by an environment in which employees were not able to dedicate 
adequate attention to their primary tasks. The company suffered from chronic project time 
overruns. Sometimes the results of information overload are tragic. Recent reports describe the 
FBI’s inability to process hours of sensitive communication believed to be of high intelligence 
value [Lichtblau, 2004].  
The attention squeeze and information overload are exacerbated by the onslaught of UCE, 
whether viewed from an individual, organizational, or macro level. At an individual level, spam is 
increasing at a great rate for some e-mail users1.  At an organizational level, spam as a 
percentage of e-mail is substantial [Melville et al., 2004]. On an aggregate level, industry reports 
suggest a steady upward trend for UCE volume. Brightmail, for example, estimates that spam as 
a percentage of total e-mail grew by approximately a third from 49 percent in June 2003 to 65 
percent in June 2004.  More somber news is that spam is moving beyond e-mail to other 
platforms, including instant messaging (spim), blogs, and mobile text messaging.  Given these 
trends and the limited time an individual can spend on dealing with e-mail, the e-mail recipient is 
bound to experience information overload. 
We now extend the concept of attention as a limited resource to the concept of the digital 
commons (Section III) and to the review of several mitigation mechanisms (Section IV). We then 
construct a causal model of the UCE industry and use the model to analyze one popular 
abatement mechanism: filtering (Section V). The last section summarizes results and outlines 
extensions. 
III. TRAGEDY OF THE DIGITAL COMMONS 
Rapidly increasing spam volume is a result of decisions made by many self-interested agents 
involved in digital marketing. These participants vie for one common resource: the attention of e-
mail recipients. A typical outcome for a situation in which many profit-seeking agents compete for 
the same scarce resource is resource overuse. The suboptimal outcome is often described as 
“the tragedy of the commons”2 [Hardin, 1968]. A vivid example is overexploitation of fish stock in 
the ocean. In an online world in which many resources are still open to all:  
Management of the digital commons is perhaps the most critical issue of market 
design that our society faces  [McFadden, 2001].  
                                                     
1 For examples see graphs at http://www.raingod.com/angus/Computing/Internet/Spam/Statistics/  
2 The term comes from the old English custom of providing a common lawn, called a commons, in the center 
of a village on which shepherds could graze their sheep. 
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THE PHYSICAL COMMONS 
A common resource is typically identified as one with the following properties:  
1. it is rival, that is, when it is used, less is available for others; and  
2.  it is nonexclusive, that is, no one can be barred from using it.  
Individuals seek disproportionate private gains through the use of the resource but do not bear 
the full cost. The oceans, forests, grazing lands, the atmosphere, outer space, and highways are 
all susceptible to problems of the commons. History is replete with examples of resource 
degradation by rational, self-interested individuals such as grazing land for sheep, fish in oceans, 
and oil reserves. 
THE DIGITAL COMMONS 
The commons problem, however, is not limited to the physical world. Members of early Usenet 
discussion groups in the 1980s faced analogous circumstances: the groups were open to 
everyone and a small set of users could degrade the environment for all. In this context, the 
pollution sprang from various sources – excessive posting or posts that were off topic, offensive, 
or contained advertising – and lowered the value for all. The notion of virtual commons was thus 
applied to an online common resource whose misuse by the few degraded the value of the 
resource for the many [Kollock and Smith, 1996].  
To formalize the application of commons logic to the Internet, two conditions are necessary 
[Regan, 2002].  
1. The Web must be a place, just as the earth is a place. The Internet is commonly and 
consistently recognized as a place for conducting a wide array of economic and social activity. 
Everyday metaphors provide evidence in this regard, with terms such as “going online,” “size of 
the internet,” “internet storm,” “virtual community,” and “virus” illustrating the mapping of the 
physical to the virtual. The place metaphor is also a fundamental concept used in Internet law:  
the cyberspace as place metaphor operates as one of the most compelling 
theories of how we have regulated cyberspace to date, and how we are likely to 
regulate it in the future [Hunter, 2003, pp. 446].  
2. An online commons must contain resources (analogous to fish stock in oceans) characterized 
by sharing, the lack of clearly defined private ownership, overuse, and negative externalities. A 
common resource is shared by many and private ownership is unclear or non-existent, just as no 
one owns the depths of the oceans and the fish stock in it. Many Internet resources involve 
sharing, including public discussion groups, peer-to-peer file sharing networks, and e-mail.  No 
one can be barred from using these areas of cyberspace. The presence of overuse by rational 
individuals leads to pollution that affects all. In this context, e-mail is a common good [Regan, 
2002].  
Spam exhibits signs of a negative externality, which results in production that is higher than 
society desires. This assertion is evidenced by the bombardment of e-mail addresses with spam 
and the resulting financial and non-pecuniary costs borne by each of the millions of users, their 
respective e-mail administrators, and employers. Table 1 draws parallels between UCE and fish 
population, which is a canonical common resource suffering from the tragedy of the commons. As 
the online commons is not a biological system, we take care in drawing the analogy 
homomorphically, i.e., by “paying attention to the peculiarities of the digital environment as well” 
[Greco and Floridi, 2004]. 
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Table 1.  Comparison of a Physical and Online Commons 
 Fisheries UCE 
Common Resource Fish stock in oceans Attention of e-mail users 
Self-interested behavior Fish as much as possible Send as much UCE as possible 
Technique Fishing expeditions Marketing campaigns 
Tragedy Over fishing Information overload 
 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE DIGITAL COMMONS TRAGEDY 
Analysis of property rights, privacy, externalities, regulation, and incentives in the context of 
common resources such as forests and grazing lands 
 brings a wide variety of perspectives and research methodologies to bear on the problem. Here, 
we briefly review three broadly defined corrective approaches to the tragedy of the commons:  
1. self-regulation through community norms;  
2. government control and regulation; and  
3. price and market mechanisms.   
SELF-REGULATION 
Even though societal norms sometimes prevent the tragedy of the commons from occurring (e.g., 
[Lessig, 2001, p. 22, note 9]), it is unlikely that such self-regulation will work in the case of spam. 
In theory, the Coase theorem (e.g. [Mankiw, 2001]) predicts that parties which are locked in a 
situation with negative externalities may negotiate their way out of the problem if property rights 
are clear and transaction costs are small. Inboxes, of course, have clearly defined property rights. 
Senders’ identity, however, is misrepresented in about 70 percent of spam messages [Fallows, 
2003: 13]. Moreover, locating the source of spam is not trivial. It took Earthlink a year and a team 
of 12 professionals to track only one spammer [Black, 2003]. Hence, the Coase theorem breaks 
down on this ground alone. Revamping the e-mail protocol to make it more difficult to hide one’s 
identity [Fallows, 2003] may resolve the spammer identification problem.  But even then, the 
transaction cost of reaching a settlement between millions of e-mail users and spammers is likely 
to be excessively high for self-regulation to work.  
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
The second mechanism is government regulation. In the United States, for example, UCE led to  
anti-spam legislation, notably, the 2004 CAN-SPAM Act. Legislative activity is likely to increase 
[Fallows, 2003]. Given the cultural dimensions of spam, regulatory responses vary by country 
[Gratton, 2004]. The approach of the European Union is to ban spam outright, with steep fines for 
violators. In contrast, the U.S. allows spam, provided several constraints are met, including 
consistency between message subject and message content and  indication in the subject line 
that the message is advertising. Regardless of the specific approach, enforceability remains an 
issue because the Internet is borderless and it is easy to locate e-mail servers in countries 
friendly to spam.  
The debate about the effectiveness of the anti-spam laws is heated [Ray and Schmitt, 2003; 
Sipior et al., 2004]. Some even suggested that anti-spam laws will result in an increase in spam 
[Squillante, 2003].  The European Commission acknowledged in a recent report that spam cannot 
be stopped by regulation alone [Swartz, 2004b]. In the U.S., the CAN-SPAM Act does not appear 
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to be working and the volume of spam is still growing [Swartz, 2004b]. One estimate claims that 
at most 3 percent of spam follows the CAN-SPAM rules [MX Logic, 2004]. Undoubtedly, recent 
lawsuits by major U.S.-based e-mail providers using the U.S. CAN-SPAM act will set important 
precedents.  
MARKET MECHANISMS 
Market mechanisms for controlling spam are still in the developing stages. One popular idea is 
the introduction of electronic stamps [Leyden, 2004].  Fixed e-postage is not unlike the Pigovian 
tax [Mankiw, 2001], a classical regulatory mechanism by which governments charge a fixed fee 
for each unit of pollution. Even though lab experiments [Kraut et al., 2002] and basic economic 
theory suggest that postage is likely to reduce UCE volume, the theory of the Pigovian tax 
suggests that the mechanism may miss the optimal spam production point. If the postage amount 
is not set correctly, then there might be either underproduction or overproduction of UCE.  The 
U.S. government also attempted to address the problem of environment degradation by creating 
a market for tradable pollution permits [Mankiw, 2001]. This policy is often considered superior to 
a Pigovian tax. An idea similar to tradable pollution permits but for the realm of electronic 
marketing was proposed by Fahlman [2002].  
Several other market mechanisms are under discussion such as attention bonds [Van Alstyne et 
al 2004]. However, because of their early-stage development, it is difficult to know which, if any, 
may achieve success. 
V. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF FILTERING 
Having outlined the digital commons problem and described several mitigation mechanisms, we 
now describe our simulation model that enables analysis of UCE dynamics and the assessment 
of the most popular UCE mitigation mechanism: filtering. The model was implemented using 
system dynamics as the modeling methodology. A comprehensive reference on system dynamics 
is Sterman [2000]3. 
Conventional commons problems such as over fishing have been modeled as dynamic systems 
(e.g. FishBanks interactive computer simulation4). The system consists of at least two agents 
whose quests for private gain reinforce one another until curtailed by limits in the environment. In 
the case of fishing, each agent maximizes revenue or profit until the system is overrun and fish 
stocks become depleted. Our approach is to adapt this model to the case of the online commons, 
specifically, UCE. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to studying spam is unique and it 
allows leveraging what we already know about physical commons to the problems of online 
commons.  
The UCE value chain includes four participants: 
1. inbox owners The inbox population is the set of feasible recipients of unwanted 
commercial e-mail. 
2. harvesters  Harvesters are in the business of discovering inboxes and compiling them 
into lists of e-mail addresses, which they sell to UCE operators. 
3. operators UCE operators administer spam campaigns, which promote products from 
sponsors. 
4. sponsors.  Sponsors support campaigns based on their success rate.    
 
                                                     
3 A quick introduction to system dynamics by Craig Kirkwood can be found at 
http://www.public.asu.edu/~kirkwood/sysdyn/SDIntro/SDIntro.htm. Additional resources can also be found 
on the official website of the International System Dynamics Society: http://www.albany.edu/cpr/sds/.  
4 http://www.unh.edu/ipssr/Lab/FishBank.html 
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 We now explain the dynamic processes relating these four value chain participants illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
ADDRESS HARVESTING 
To receive UCE, an inbox address must be discovered by a harvester. Inbox addresses can be 
collected in hundreds of ways [Brain, 2004]. One of them is via directory harvest attacks (DHA), in 
which automated programs query e-mail servers for the existence of millions of commonly 
designated usernames5. The Center for Democracy and Technology [2003] reports that 
harvesters are also effective at gathering e-mail addresses posted on the web6.  Considering the 
many ways in which harvesters add e-mail addresses to their lists, it is reasonable to assume that 
it is only a matter of time before an e-mail account is discovered (Figure 27). We model harvesting 
by including an average inbox discovery delay. Delays, including the discovery delay, are shown 
in Figure 2 as two short lines crossing an arrow.  
ATTENTION AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
The attention resource can be measured in terms of time [Simon, 1971]. A survey conducted by 
the American Management Association found that an employee typically spends about a quarter 
of her day on e-mail [Swartz, 2004b].  Employees possess a limited attention resource. The total 
demand for attention from regular and UCE e-mail is proportional to their respective volumes 
delivered to inboxes. Assuming that regular e-mail has a higher priority than spam, the time left 
for UCE is the difference between the attention resource and the attention devoted to regular e-
mail (Figure 2). If the arriving volume of electronic messages is greater than what an individual is 
comfortable handling, then, using Herbert Simon’s terminology, information overload occurs.  
RESPONSE RATE 
Advertisers know about the negative relationship between advertising volume that an individual is 
exposed to and the response rate to advertisements [Rudolph, 1947; Starch, 1966; Houston and 
Scott, 1984]. Houston and Scott [1984], for example, statistically showed a negative convex 
relationship between advertising readership and the number of pages in a journal. Recent 
research shows that the negative relationship holds equally well for electronic marketing. Martin 
et al. [2003] found that in the case of permission-based advertising for a company operating from 
Finland, the likelihood of visiting a link advertised within an e-mail decreased as volume of e-mail 
from the company increased. A survey by the Pew Internet & American Life Project [Rainie and 
Fallows, 2004] found a decline in the readership of  UCE while the UCE volume increased.  
Anecdotal evidence from UCE operators [Hansell, 2003] also confirms the existence of a negative 
relationship between the amount of spam that a finite group receives and the response rate. This 
phenomenon is indicated by the loop in Figure 2 comprising UCE volume – attention required by 
UCE – information overload – response rate.  
 
                                                     
5 See http://www.postini.com/services/what_are_dhas.html 
6 An example of a clearly illegal harvesting technique is the  AOL employee arrested for stealing the e-mail 
addresses of 92 million AOL users [Swartz, 2004a]. The employee sold the list to an operator of an online 
gambling business in Las Vegas for $100,000. That person in turn repackaged and resold the addresses to 
spammers for over a million dollars. 
7 Figure 2, is a schematic of our system dynamics model.  
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PROFITABILITY 
For a given overall response rate, the total number of responses a company receives increases 
with its share in the e-mail volume (in Figure 2, this result is captured by positive links between 
UCE Volume from Operator and Responses to UCE from Operator). More responses imply more 
revenue (Figure 2). More revenue means more profit. Greater profit implies that with some delay 
(shown as two short lines crossing an arrow in Figure 2) more budget is allocated for UCE by a 
sponsor and thus expenditure on UCE volume increases. The UCE volume that a sponsor can 
buy for a given expenditure is inversely proportional to the UCE price that an operator charges for 
sending electronic messages.  
It is clear from Figure 2 that UCE volume tends to increase while profits from UCE campaigns 
increase. This concept is captured by two positive Sponsor Profit Loops.  Starting new campaigns 
is easy and quick thanks to specialized software packages [Lemke, 2003]. An example of such a 
tool is iBuilder from VerticalResponse8. Hence, campaigns involve low marginal cost, and 
therefore cost recovery is unimportant [Kraut et al., 2002]. A campaign requires an extremely low 
response rate to break even: 0.001 percent is often sufficient [Fallows, 2003: 26]. The causality 
acting through the response rate forms the Attention Limit Loop (Figure 2), which checks the 
exponential growth of spam. 
RESULTS: BASE CASE 
We conducted computer simulations for a fictitious organization with 10,000 inboxes. The 
organization could be, for example, a company with employees or an e-mail provider hosting e-
mail accounts. We allow only a small portion of the accounts to be initially known to spammers. 
However, due to address harvesting (Section V), the number of discovered accounts increases 
over time . In the model, we assume that UCE budget is proportional to the profitability of UCE 
campaigns; that is, the more profitable the UCE, the greater budget will be allocated for e-
marketing. Table 2 summarizes the assumptions of the model. Parameter values were suggested 
by published surveys and anecdotal evidence from experts.   
 
Table 2. Model Assumptions 
 
Figure 3 shows the base run for the simulated 2 years of life of our fictitious organization. Inbox 
discovery is proportional to the number of remaining undiscovered inboxes, and therefore the 
number of  discovered inboxes grows monotonically and asymptotically toward the total inbox 
population (Figure 3a). Within two years, more than 80% of the inboxes are  discovered. Positive 
profits accrued through spam campaigns (Figure 3b) encourage sponsors to allocate even more 
                                                     
8 http://www.verticalresponse.com/ 
Item Implementation Source
Organization size 10000 inboxes Assumption 
Initial population of discovered 
inboxes 10 Inboxes Assumption 
Time spent on e-mail by an 
employee 2 Hours/day [Swartz, 2004b] 
Average regular e-mail volume 20 Messages/day  Assumption 
Base price of sending 1,000 UCE 
messages $5 per 1000 messages  [Martin et al., 2003] 
Response rate A declining function of UCE volume 
See Response Rate section 
above 
E-mail marketing budget 
Allocated proportionally to the 
past profit from the UCE 
campaign 
Assumption 
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resources for electronic marketing (Figure 3c and Figure 2). Greater UCE budgets allow each 
sponsor to spend more on e-mail (sponsor’s expenditure in Figure 2), which contributes to the 
growth of the UCE volume from operator A and B (Figure 2). Hence, global UCE volume grows 
as well (Figure 3d and Figure 2). The UCE volume that arrives to an individual inbox also grows 













c. UCE Budget d. UCE Volume  
 








RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF SPAM FILTERING 
When foreseeing an approaching information overload, Simon suggested  filtering as a possible 
solution [Simon, 1971]. Filtering of unsolicited e-mail is capable of reducing demand for attention. 
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active e-mail screening at work [Fallows, 2003]. The popularity of this solution feeds the growth of 
a new and active anti-spam software industry. The method, however, is flawed.  Many inbox 
users fear that aggressive filtering may lead to some legitimate e-mail being discarded. The Pew 
Internet Project [Fallows, 2003: 29] found that about one third of the respondents feared their 
incoming e-mail might be blocked, and 13 percent were convinced that it happened to them. 
About a quarter of respondents feared that their outgoing e-mails might be filtered out by the 
intended recipient.   
In this subsection we study the effect of filtering on UCE volume using the computer model 
introduced in Figure 2. We assume that the organization starts filtering e-mail in the third year.  
To address fears that legitimate e-mail may be discarded, the organization discards only UCE-
suspects that it is most confident about.  In other words, only some percentage of the UCE 
volume that arrives to the organization is delivered to recipients and the rest is filtered out. In 
reality, the portion of UCE messages which gets through the filter changes daily9. However, this 
model is concerned with the overall effect of filtering, rather than with daily variations in the 
positive identifications by a filtering algorithm. Therefore, the model assumes that every day the 
filter recognizes some fixed fraction of the incoming UCE volume as spam, which is consequently 
discarded. 
Figure 4 shows a simulation that extends the run in Figure 3 for 5 more years (2555 days total).  
The figure compares the case when filtering is used to the case when no filtering is implemented.  
Under each scenario, during the seven-year period, harvesters discover all inboxes (Figure 4 a). 
Figures 4b through 4e show the case when the organization performs no active filtering with 
dotted lines. As in the base case simulation discussed earlier, driven by the two Sponsor Profit 
Loops (Figure 2), each operator continues to increase UCE that leads to the growth in global 
volume of unsolicited messages (Figure 4b), which in turn contributes to the increase in spam 
arriving to individual accounts (Figure 4c). Eventually, attention required by UCE outgrows 
attention available for UCE and information overload becomes more strongly felt (Figure 2)10. E-
mail recipients, who are overwhelmed by increasing volumes of spam (Figure 4c), tend to delete 
most of it, thus driving the overall response rate down (Figure 2 and the ‘no filtering’ case in 
Figure 4d). The declining response rate leads to lower revenue and lower profit (use Figure 2 to 
trace the logic and Figure 4e for the resulting profit trajectory). With some delay, the declining rate 
leads to lower revenue and lower profit (use Figure 2 to trace the logic and Figure 4e for the 
resulting profit trajectory). With some delay, the declining financial performance of the electronic 
marketing campaigns affects the sponsors’ UCE budgets (Figure 2).  As a result, the UCE volume 
tapers off (later portions of Figure 4b).    
                                                     
9 For a detailed account of the filtering procedures followed by a typical medium-sized organization, see 
Melville et al. [2004]. 
10 According to the systems dynamics methodology (Footnote 3) dominant loops drive the dynamics of a 
system. Thus, positive Profit Loops drive the system initially, resulting in exponential growth of UCE volume. 
When the growth starts slowing down (as seen in Figure 4), it means that some balancing force becomes 
stronger in the system. In other words, the balancing loop Attention Limit gains force. Eventually, the 
Attention Limit loop becomes dominant and slows down the growth of UCE. Attention overload is the reason 
for the Attention Limit loop. Although Figure 2 does not show which loop is dominant at every moment, once 
loops are identified in Figure 2 we can draw conclusions, based on the system trajectories, which loops are 
influencing system’s behavior. 
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c. Average UCE Volume to a Discovered Box 
 
d. Response Rate 
e. Sponsor’s Profit 
 
 
Figure 4. Organization Simulated for 7 Years 






EFFECT OF FILTERING  
The effect of filtering is clearly visible starting in year three. Filtering reduces the burden from 
UCE on an individual by lowering UCE volume arriving at an individual inbox (solid line in Figure 
4c). Feeling less overwhelmed by incoming spam, we assume that readers tend to read a greater 
fraction of incoming messages, thus increasing the overall response rate (solid line in Figure 4d). 
Better response rates drive profitability upwards (solid line in Figure 4e), which in turn, as shown 
in Figure 2, encourages greater UCE budgets, thus allowing sponsors to spend more on e-mail 
marketing. Greater expenditure by each sponsor boosts overall UCE volume (filtered case in 
Figure 4b).  Hence, while lowering the burden of spam on individuals (Figure 4c), filtering is likely 
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VI. DISCUSSION  
In this paper we addressed the growing problem of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE). 
Adopting the viewpoint that in an information-rich society attention is a limited resource [Simon, 
1971]  allowed us to describe the problem of spam in terms of a common resource. The common 
resource framework is well understood in economic literature and is helpful in explaining many 
phenomena that lead to the overexploitation of limited resources. The situation of overexploitation 
of a resource by self-interested agents is generally referred to as the tragedy of the commons. 
The framework was applied to other Internet-related problems (e.g.,[ McFadden, 2001; Kollock 
and Smith, 1996; Regan, 2002; Hunter, 2003]). When applied to the virtual world, the 
phenomenon is dubbed the tragedy of the digital commons.  
We reviewed several solutions to the spam problem: self-regulation, government regulation, 
market mechanisms, and filtering. We concluded that based on theoretical and empirical 
evidence self-regulation is unlikely to resolve the problem. Recent attempts at government 
regulation failed to lower the spam volume. In view of the commons theory and its applications to 
the cases when traditional resources are overused, market mechanisms appear to be quite 
promising; but they are still in their early development stages. Finally, we offered a simulation 
analysis of filtering, which is currently the most popular option to combat UCE.  
Filtering was offered as a possible solution to information overload long before e-mail became 
popular [Simon, 1971]. Filtering, however, may impose costs that exceed the benefit [Cranor and 
Lamacchia, 1998]. The benefit is the reduction of spam volume arriving to an individual inbox. 
However, as our discussion in Section V showed, the use of filtering is likely to stimulate 
production of spam. Greater spam volume consumes more of an organizations’ bandwidth and 
processing resources [Melville et al., 2004]. Furthermore, organizations and spam senders 
iteratively improve their filtering and electronic marketing tools, respectively, with no clear end to, 
or winner of, such an arms race. The continuous anti-spam effort is costly. Inbox owners bear the 
cost too because false positives during spam filtering lead to the deletion of desired e-mail. From 
a theoretical standpoint, this loss reduces consumer surplus [Loder et al., 2004].  Table 3 
summarizes benefits and drawbacks of the filtering solution.  







The evidence and analysis in this paper indicate that currently available anti-spam options will not 
be effective in the long term at containing the spam pandemic. Hence, the search for more potent 
methods of abating the spam crisis and frustrating the unchecked onslaught of the electronic 
marketing industry must continue. In Section I, we pointed out that the direct marketing industry, 
which is legitimate, is affected by UCE.  In Sidebar 1 we offer suggestions to the direct marketing 
industry on how to cope with UCE.  
In our future work, we plan to apply the theoretical framework and the computer model developed 
in this paper to the in-depth analysis of government regulation and market mechanisms as 
solutions to the spam problem.   
 
Benefit 
Lower UCE volume to an inbox 
Drawbacks 
Greater global volume of UCE 
Emergence of the costly “anti-spam arms race” 
False-positives lower consumer surplus 
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SIDEBAR 1. DIRECT MARKETING 
To compete effectively with UCE for customer attention, the legitimate direct marketing industry will need to: 
1. foster relationships with customers 
2. be sensitive to the optimal emailing frequency 
3. limit email to customers who consented to receiving such communication 
4. target and customize email, so as to make email communication useful to the recipient 
5. use email as only one dimension in a comprehensive marketing campaign 
6. actively distinguish itself from UCE 
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APPENDIX I. MODEL EQUATIONS 
This appendix presents the model equations. Note that the described Profitability is for sponsor A 
and operator A. Equations for the profit loop formed by sponsor B and operator B are identical 
and differ from A only in terms of subscripts. 
Address Harvesting  
 Average time to discovery dt  
 Undiscovered inboxes uI  
 Discovered inboxes ( )/ /d u dd dt I I t=  
 Total inboxes u dI I I= +  
 Fraction of inboxes discovered /di I I=  
Attention and Information Overload  
 Time an employee can spend on email T  
 Attention resource of an organization A T I= ⋅  
 Discovered attention resource dA i A= ⋅  
 Time it takes to read an email e  
 Regular email volume to discovered inboxes rE  
 Attention devoted to regular mail r rA e E= ⋅  
 Attention available for UCE UCE d rA A A= −  
 UCE volume UCE A BE E E= +  
 Attention required by UCE UCED e E= ⋅  
 Information overload / UCEO D A=  
Response Rate  
 Maximum response rate maxr  
 Response rate ( )maxr r f O= ⋅  
 ( )f O  ( )0 1f O≤ ≤      ( )' 0f O <  
Profitability  
 Sponsor A’s profit A AM Cπ = −  
 Budget duration τ  
 Average daily profit ( ) ( )/ /d dt π π π τ= −  
 Sponsor A’s expenditure /A AC B τ=  
 Price of UCE p  
 UCE volume from operator A /A AE C p=  
 Responses to UCE from operator A A AR r E= ⋅  
 Average revenue per sale m  
 Sponsor A’s revenue A AM m R= ⋅  
 Marketing fraction a  
 Adjustment of spam budget  B a π+ = ⋅  
 Sponsor A’s UCE budget ( )/ A Ad dt B B C+= −  
 
90                                 Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 16, 2005)73-90                            
 
Mitigating the Tragedy of the Digital Commons: The Problem of Unsolicited Commercial E-mail by O. V. 
Pavlov, N. Melville, and R. K.  Plice 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Oleg V. Pavlov is Assistant Professor of Economics and System Dynamics at Worcester 
Polytechnic Institute, USA. He works in the areas of the economics of information systems, 
computational economics, and system dynamics. He earned a B.S. degree in physics and 
computer science and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Southern California. Before 
joining WPI in August 2002, he was a postdoctoral fellow in Information Systems at Boston 
University School of Management. His publications appear in Computational Economics, System 
Dynamics Review, Journal of Economic Issues, and Journal of Macroeconomics. He contributed 
to the book Complex Economic Dynamics, Volume II by Richard H. Day (The MIT Press 1999). 
Nigel Melville is Assistant Professor of Information Systems at Boston College. He earned his 
Ph.D. in management from the Graduate School of Management at the University of California, 
Irvine. His research interests include IT business value and information security. His papers 
appear in MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, and Communications of the ACM. Prior 
to earning his Ph.D., he worked as an engineer for several years and co-founded a software 
company. He earned an M.S. in electrical and computer engineering from UC Santa Barbara and 
a B.S. in electrical engineering from UCLA. 
Robert K. Plice is Assistant Professor of Information and Decision Systems in the College of 
Business Administration at San Diego State University. He obtained his Ph.D. degree from the 
Graduate School of Management at the University of California, Irvine. His research interests 
include the economics of B2B ecommerce, the impact of network-centric organizations on firm 
strategy, and the information economics of electronic communications. He holds MS degrees in 
business administration and computer science, and a BA degree in economics. Prior to joining 
SDSU he was active in the computer systems-integration and software industries as a manager, 
consultant, and engineer. 
Copyright © 2005 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of 
all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not 
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on 
the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information 
Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on 
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to publish 













                                                                                  
 ISSN: 1529-3181                                    
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 
Paul Gray 
Claremont Graduate University 
AIS SENIOR  EDITORIAL BOARD 
Detmar Straub 
Vice President Publications  
Georgia State University 
Paul Gray                                 
Editor, CAIS                                
Claremont Graduate University 
Sirkka Jarvenpaa 
Editor, JAIS 
University of Texas at Austin 
Edward A. Stohr 
Editor-at-Large 
Stevens Inst. of Technology 
Blake Ives                                
Editor, Electronic Publications  
University of Houston 
Reagan Ramsower 
Editor, ISWorld Net 
Baylor University 
CAIS ADVISORY BOARD   
Gordon Davis 
University of Minnesota 
 Ken Kraemer 
Univ. of Calif. at Irvine 
M.Lynne Markus  
Bentley College 
Richard Mason 
Southern Methodist Univ.   
Jay Nunamaker                    
University of Arizona 
Henk Sol 
Delft  University 
Ralph Sprague 
University of Hawaii 
Hugh J. Watson 
University of Georgia  
CAIS SENIOR EDITORS  
Steve Alter 
U. of San Francisco 
Chris Holland 




Stevens Inst.of Technology 
CAIS EDITORIAL BOARD 
Tung Bui 




University of Richmond 
Donna Dufner 
U.of Nebraska -Omaha 
Omar El Sawy  
Univ. of Southern Calif. 
Ali Farhoomand 





Robert L.  Glass 
Computing Trends 
Sy Goodman  
Ga. Inst.  of Technology 
Joze Gricar 
University of Maribor 
Ake Gronlund 
University of Umea,  
Ruth Guthrie 
California State Univ. 
Alan Hevner 
Univ. of South Florida 
Juhani Iivari 
Univ. of Oulu 
Claudia Loebbecke 
University of Cologne 
Michel Kalika 





Don McCubbrey  
University of Denver 
Michael Myers 
University of Auckland 
Seev Neumann                    
Tel Aviv University 
Dan Power  








Natl. U. of Singapore 
Doug Vogel  
City Univ. of Hong Kong 
Rolf Wigand  
U. of Arkansas,LittleRock 
Upkar Varshney  




U. of Nebraska-Omaha 
Ping Zhang 
Syracuse University 
   
   DEPARTMENTS 
Global Diffusion of the Internet.  
Editors: Peter Wolcott and Sy Goodman 
Information Technology and Systems.  
Editors: Alan Hevner and Sal March  
Papers in French 
Editor: Michel Kalika 
Information Systems and Healthcare 
Editor: Vance Wilson  
ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL                                                                              
Eph McLean  
AIS, Executive Director 
Georgia State University 
Reagan Ramsower 
Publisher, CAIS 
Baylor University 
 
 
 
